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The aim of this paper lies in reconsidering the confrontation between essentialism and 
constructionism in terms of a phenomenological perspective. The author claims that phenomenological 
essentialism as a “science of intersubjective confirmation” and a “science of mutual recognition” will 
conciliate the radical epistemological and ethical aporia between essentialism and constructionism. 
However, this does not mean phenomenology works as a compromise plan; it is a new form of 
essentialism completely different from traditional essentialism.
To clarify the basic schema of traditional essentialism, this paper picks up Plato and Leibniz. 
It is clear that the concept of “essence” in their two philosophies is closely connected with the 
concept of “substance,” so that it retains invariable and absolute characteristics which may turn out 
to oppress social and cultural minorities because the idea of substantial essence can label someone as 
having substantial unchangeable characteristics. On the other hand, philosophers such as Hume and 
Nietzsche point out that human cognition or knowledge is inevitably constructed, and they claim that 
knowledge can be regarded as “a bundle of impressions” in Hume’s philosophy and as something 
“power-correlational” in Nietzsche’s philosophy. It seems that constructionism is more persuasive 
than essentialism in terms of the possibility of experiential verification and obtaining a clear vision of 
cognitive structure on the surface, but the situation is not simple.
If concepts such as “freedom,” “equality,” or “justice” and social systems such as “law,” 
“education,” or “human rights” are socially constructed by the interaction of a community without any 
evidence, these concepts and systems will lose the ground of universal justification. In other words, 
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it is not possible for constructionists to establish a universal basis for ethics and morals in order to 
liberate the voiceless of social and cultural minorities. 
A way of thinking is required which does not abandon the possibility of universal “intersubjective 
confirmation” but simultaneously denies the principle of violence that suppresses social and cultural 
minorities. That is to say, a new form of essentialism should be oriented to the “mutual recognition” of 
difference.
1. Introduction
Essentialism and constructionism are two poles in philosophy, and they are antagonistic in terms 
of an epistemic sense. Even a philosophy that is not generally categorized into these two schemas 
can be involved in the similar epistemic confrontation because somehow every philosophy 
shares cognitive antinomy such as a situation between dogmatism and relativism, realism and 
nominalism, or logicism and psychologism. The former “ism” believes that there is the universal 
beyond differences while the latter denies the idea of universality or truth itself. The question of 
whether it is possible for the subject to grasp something objective and universal is the core motif 
in every epistemological dilemma. What sort of philosophy as a discipline oriented to universality 
should be involved in that epistemological dilemma? Is there objectivity or universality in the 
world? If so, how can the subject reach it? This is the basic form of the epistemological challenge.
In particular, the confrontation between essentialism and constructionism goes beyond 
philosophical arguments over principles and substantially influences belief conflicts in the 
practical realm of social theories. For instance, Edward W. Said claims in his famous work, 
Orientalism, “The orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations framed 
by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and 
later, Western empire.”? Therefore, his contention is that “Orientalism is fundamentally a political 
doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the 
Orient’s difference with its weakness.”? According to Said, it can be concluded that the essentialist 
thinking that Western thought has historically employed is the origin of the evil of discrimination, 
because it oppressively and one-sidedly labels someone as having unchangeable characters. It is 
critical for Said to uncover how Western society has constructed cultural categories without any 
evidence; essentialism tends to transforming into dogmatism.
The ideological conflict between essentialism and constructionism has deeply synchronized 
with the voiceless of oppressed and downtrodden people in history.? The oppressive relationship 
between the strong and the weak based on the power of a ruler over the ruled can emerge 
variably in the context of philosophy as an asymmetrical power of rationality over irrationality, 
consciousness over unconsciousness, or actuality over latency. In this regard, essentialism seems 
to rest on a dogmatic and violent way of thinking. Constructionism, on the other hand, seems to 
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have the potential to rescue the voiceless of social minorities. 
By saying that every custom and knowledge has been socially constructed through the 
historical language game with no evidence, certainly every prejudice and discrimination would 
lose its justification. However, the situation is not simple, because constructionism also leads to 
relativize concepts such as “freedom,” “equality,” or “justice” and social systems such as “law,” 
“education,” or “human rights” by regarding them as something socially constructed through the 
interaction of a community. If there is no reasons to justify freedom of speech, for example, how is 
it possible for those subject to violation of human rights to insist on freedom of life? This aporia is 
not just related to a matter of ideological standpoints but a matter of epistemology.   
Traditional essentialist thinking has substantiated the relationship between the center and 
the periphery, and it has always been dangerous to oppress social minorities latently and violently. 
On the other hand, it is not possible for constructionism to establish a universal basis for ethics 
and morals because it claims that all things and concepts are socially and culturally constructed, 
including values and meanings. Clearly, the aporia is not solved by utilitarianism and pragmatism 
because a value judgement of an act on each occasion itself requires something as a standard.  
The aim of this paper lies in reconsidering the confrontation between essentialism and 
constructionism in terms of epistemological validity. The author claims that phenomenological 
thinking as a principle of philosophy conciliates the dichotomy of essentialism and 
constructionism. This does not mean that phenomenology works as a compromise plan. It is 
rather a new form of essentialism that is completely different from traditional essentialism. 
In other words, phenomenological essentialism does not abandon the possibility of universal 
“intersubjective confirmation” but simultaneously denies the principle of violence that suppresses 
the voiceless of social minorities by orienting to the “mutual recognition” of difference.?
First, to clarify the basic schema of traditional essentialism, this paper focuses on Plato 
and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. It can be argued that the concept of “essence” in their two 
philosophies is closely connected with the concept of “substance” so that it retains invariable, 
absolute characteristics that may prescribe the specific role and identity of a person in the society. 
Following this, the contrasting principles of constructionism are elucidated by reexamining David 
Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche. They present a radical antithesis to epistemological essentialism. 
Finally, this paper shows that contemporary thought in social constructionism and sociology of 
knowledge cannot avoid relativist consequences, even though it should be differentiated from 
simple and naïve skepticism. If the human rights of social and cultural minorities are to be 
guaranteed, a universal basis for ethics and values is required. This means that a philosophy should 
be sought on an epistemological foundation in which common understandings are created and a 
sense of mutual recognition is validated. The author claims that phenomenological essentialism 
as a “science of intersubjective confirmation” and a “science of mutual recognition” will entirely 
conciliate the radical epistemological aporia in the history of philosophy and create the possibility 
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of common understandings in the realm of meanings and values.
2. Essentialism and Constructionism 
2-1. Essentialism in Tradition: Plato and Leibniz 
The essentialist tradition holds that the essence of an object can be obtained by questioning what 
it is. In the history of philosophy, the beginning of essentialism can be found in Plato’s idealism. 
Also, in the modern philosophy, Leibniz inherited the traditional essentialist thought from Plato 
although he transformed it into Monadology.
Plato presents essentialism as a “theory of ideas.” He describes an “idea” using parables, 
the most famous of which is the “parable of the cave.”? In this parable, prisoners are held in a 
cave, and the only thing they can see is the wall at the bottom of the cave. There is a fire at the 
cave entrance and a raised area, on which various statues and figures of animals and human 
beings made of wood and stone move between the fire and the prisoners. Prisoners can see only 
the shadows of the statues and figures on the cave wall. According to Plato, we are like the 
prisoners because “the prison house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you 
will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the 
intellectual world.”?
Plato sets pure intellection and thinking against senses and desire in order to reach “idea” 
itself.? What is notable is that “essence,” “idea,” and “form” are all inevitably united with the 
concept of “substance” (Ousia) in Plato’s philosophy. Therefore, essence means not only what 
a thing is but also what it should be, based on the true form of existence and the real being 
itself. In any circumstances, essence maintains self-identity, and it should be distinguished from 
variable individual objects.? According to Plato, “You know of no way in which anything comes 
into existence except by participation in its own proper essence.”? Moreover, he wrote, “And 
of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, 
each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with 
one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many.”?? In short, Plato contends that 
essence is grasped by the intellectual process as what is in common among individuals. 
Here, notably, all ideas should be oriented to the “idea of good” as the supreme court. 
Through the act of recollection, thinking can reach the world of ideas existing beyond the actual 
world of the senses, and thinking will meet the idea of good that is regarded as the ultimate cause 
of the world. That is to say, “in the world of knowledge, the idea of good appears last of all, and 
is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things 
beautiful and right.”?? If the idea of good, the idea of all ideas, is to be considered “the universal 
author of all things,” “the good has a place of honor yet higher”?? than “substance” in fact. 
Therefore, it should be said that everything in the world and beyond the world depends on the idea 
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of good, and, in Plato’s theory, the aim of philosophy lies in grasping it.
Importantly, “essence” refers not only to theoretical “meanings” but also to “values” such 
as truth, beauty, and goodness in the tradition of the Western philosophy. Thus, essentialism is not 
easily collapsed by constructionist theories, as essentialism is supported by a strong motivation 
toward understanding the meaning of life based on goodness and happiness. That is to say, 
essentialist views have natural persuasive reasons that comes from their intuitive moral appeal. 
In short, for Plato, “ideas” exist as “substance” beyond the world, the becoming, and the 
protean phenomenal world. Thereafter, it follows that the concept of “essence” can be defined as a 
substantial and permanent entity predicated outside the life-world in the Husserlian sense, and all 
ideas should be fundamentally oriented to the idea of good.
Next, before turning to the philosophy of Leibniz, it is important to outline the fundamental 
presuppositions of his worldview, in particular, the “existence of God” and the “theory of 
pre-established harmony.” According to Leibniz, “God is an absolutely perfect being” both 
metaphysically and morally.?? The world is created by God, and God has always maintained 
supreme perfection of the world in order to realize the idea of goodness. Therefore, “in whatever 
manner God might have created the world, it would always have been regular and in a certain 
order.”??
Leibniz insists that each individual can have a close encounter with God by means of spirit. 
However, he also points out that each individual remains in imperfection before the presence of 
God, because it is not possible that a form of thought of an individual, i.e., human understanding, 
can completely reach up toward his transcendent existence. 
In Leibniz, the concept of “essence” is called “individual substance” or “substantial form,” 
and in his later works it is also called the “Monad.”?? According to him, “essence” refers to what 
is given by God, that is, called “hæcceity” in the Scholastic term, through which possible being 
can be realized into actual being. This is “the nature of an individual substance or of a complete 
being, namely, to afford a conception so complete that the concept shall be sufficient for the 
understanding of it and for the deduction of all the predicates of which the substance is or may 
become the subject.”?? It can be argued that “individual substance” includes all characteristics and 
predicates of the subject in not only the present but also the past and future.
For instance, when God investigates the individual substance of the mind of Alexander the 
Great, he will be able to know a priori whether the king destroys Darius and Porus or whether 
he dies a natural death or dies by poison.?? Namely, “everything which is to happen to anyone 
is already virtually included in his nature or concept, as all the properties are contained in the 
definition of a circle.”??
Naturally, it is not surprising that Leibniz agrees with the theory of innate ideas, because 
God has already determined who you are and what the world is in aprioricity, and all these things 
have been given to the human spirit in advance. “The soul virtually knows those things, and 
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needs only to be reminded (animadverted) to recognize the truths. Consequently, it possesses at 
least the ideas upon which those truths depend. We may say even that it already possesses those 
truths, if we consider them at the relations of the ideas.”?? The spirit created by God recollects the 
essences of objects and already knows what they potentially are. Although there are often obscure 
perceptions, eventually, an essence will be grasped by the spirit remembering it.??
In the same way as Plato, Leibniz connects the idea of essence with the concept of 
substance. Instead of “the idea of good,” “God” is the absolute and perfect being that assures the 
conditions and grounds of essence to secure the goodness of life and the world. Of course, the 
forms of traditional essentialism appeared multiple, but essence needs to be substituted because 
of defending the certainty of existence of “ideas” or “God,” which plays a significant role in the 
order of goodness and evil.
However, it can be said that these types of essentialism are easily transformed into 
oppressive and pinning labels against social and cultural minorities in terms of the origin of the 
clan, gender, or religion as well as in the contemporary society, where various contradictions and 
discriminations lying under modern rationality and enlightenment have appeared. On the one 
hand, essence would work for keeping a well-ordered system giving assurance of a possibility 
to goodness and happiness, but on the other hand, the character of substantive essence would 
fix the order of evil and disgrace. There is nothing for the idea of substantial essence but to be 
reconsidered when those grounds are directly based on transcendent beings beyond this world.
2-2. Philosophy of Constructionism: Hume and Nietzsche 
Constructionism is another tradition in the history of the Western philosophy. It has appeared as if 
to countervail essentialism, claiming that cognition itself has already been constructed. This section 
picks up Hume and Nietzsche to sketch the basic principle of constructionism, focusing on how 
the concept of “essence” is captured in constructionist thinking. Hume stands in the site of British 
empiricism against continental rationalism, and this means he thinks that even an essence should be 
constituted based on empirical sense data. Nietzsche is more radical than Hume in that he refuses 
all heritages of modernity together with morality of Christianity by declaring death of God.
For Hume, sciences should basically be built on the foundation of “experience” 
and “observation.”?? Simply speaking, because all sciences must be based on the 
solid foundation of “experience” and “observation,” every thought, idea, value, and 
norm cannot be innate but must be constructed by experiential elements. Naturally, 
transcendent essence existing beyond experiences and observations should be denied, 
and Hume attempts to elucidate the structure of human cognition and the objectivity 
of epistemological objects. 
Hume claims that all human perception can be divided into two distinct elements: 
“impressions” and “ideas.” While “impressions,” such as “sensations,” “passions,” and 
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“emotions,” can be defined as “perceptions, which enter with most force and violence,” “ideas” 
refers to “the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.”?? In other words, this is the 
difference between feeling and thinking. In addition, both can resolve themselves into “simple” 
and “complex,” and complex impressions and ideas are constituted of simple ones.?? The important 
thing is that “all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, 
which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.”??
The claim that all simple ideas correspond with simple impressions means that conceptions 
and thoughts are all constituted from impressions. The complex ideas in philosophy can be divided 
into “relations,” “modes,” and “substances,” and the principle of connecting different simple ideas 
into complex ones is known as “association.” Hume maintains that “The qualities, from which this 
association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey’d from one idea to another, 
are three, viz. RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT.”?? 
That is, when people form a relationship between two ideas, the two ideas must have already been 
experienced in the context of resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect in the past. Therefore, 
“the idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, 
that are united by the imagination,” and “the particular qualities, which form a substance, are 
commonly referr’d to an unknown something, in which they are suppos’d to inhere.”?? The idea of 
a substance is a result of passive association and nothing other than a collection of simple ideas, 
that is, originally a collection of simple impressions through empirical recurrence.
Hume’s argument seems stronger than substantial essentialism from the viewpoint of 
experiential verifiability. However, the question remains regarding how it is possible to create 
an order of values and ethics without a theory of ideas or the existence of God. For Hume, every 
perception, including essences and values, is regarded as a bundle of impressions, and objectivity 
and constancy derive only from “custom” in daily life.??
In this regard, the ethics of Hume, i.e., the ethics of sympathy, requiring common sense 
among people which enables them directly to sympathize with feelings and thoughts of others, is 
built on fragile underpinnings and depends on a flimsy reason: “The minds of all men are similar in 
their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are 
not, in some degree, susceptible.”?? It can be argued that Hume’s philosophy is characterized as a 
mixture of radical empiricism and facile optimism; however, it is difficult to say that he appreciated 
the fundamental significance of essentialism in terms of how to assure the grounds of ethics.
Next, Nietzsche pushed ahead with the constructionist project. His creativity and originality 
consist of his radical consideration of the epistemological aporia as a problem of values. Thus, he 
understood more seriously than Hume the riskiness of how constructionism could lead to value 
disorder.
For Nietzsche, the problem to be solved is how to rebuild the European humanities, which 
philosophy and Christianity have spoiled in the diachronic history. The Western philosophy has 
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always presupposed the concept of “essence itself,” “truth itself,” and “thing in itself”; however, 
they should be regarded as fictions that emaciated human instinct created for self-preservation. 
Without a joint illusion such as religion, communicative spirit, habits, customs, and normative 
consciousness, how is it possible to justify the affirmative attitude towards life such as rapture and 
intoxication even in the age of nihilism? The epistemology in Nietzsche, i.e., the chaos–power 
schema, should be understood in this context.
Is there a right to perceive “being itself” in the first place? According to Nietzsche, modern 
philosophy from Descartes to Kant places “cogito” as an erroneous starting point “as if there 
existed ‘facts of consciousness’ ―and no phenomenalism in introspection.”?? However, the idea 
of “facts of consciousness” or “consciousness itself” stands at the height of absurdity because 
consciousness always exists as relational consciousness in correlation to “will to power.” We have 
no right to perceive “being itself.” 
Nietzsche wrote that “Knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases 
with every increase of power―The meaning of ‘knowledge’: here, as in the case of ‘good’ or 
‘beautiful,’ the concept is to be regarded in a strict and narrow anthropocentric and biological 
sense.” In other words, “the measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to 
which the will to power grows in a species: a species grasps a certain amount of reality in order to 
become master of it, in order to press it into service.”?? It is easy to recognize that Nietzsche inverts 
the order of subject–object schema in traditional epistemology,?? establishing instead a power–
correlation schema, which means that there is no absolute truth in the world, and a perceptional 
object always appears as something valuable and meaningful “for me” or for “my” interpretation. 
Power is the fundamental principle, and an object is interpreted in correlation to it: “No, facts is 
precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself.’”?? 
Nietzsche claims that “the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no 
meaning behind it, but countless meanings.―‘Perspectivism.’”?? As a result, it is unavoidable that 
“essence,” the “essential nature” is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity; 
in other words, even essence is just one possible answer to the question “what is that for me?”?? 
Consequently, the meaning of essence should be changed from what we think to be substantial and 
invariable to only a terminal phenomenon that has been constituted by “my” desire.
As mentioned above, Nietzsche deeply recognized the result of constructionist thinking. 
The world image in which “being itself” is presupposed spoils the existence of human beings 
because the true world “is the great inspirer of doubt and devaluator in respect of the world we 
are.”?? However, simultaneously, the question has remained unanswered: How can we stand up 
to the world without truth? If this is not possible, nihilism will occur. Nietzsche responded to the 
question with the concept of positive nihilism and eternal recurrence; however, these views on 
overcoming nihilism may be questioned again because there is no path to others in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. Stated another way, self-affirmation should be done by oneself without any common 
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norms in Nietzsche, but no evidence has been provided to suggest that a person would be able to 
affirm oneself without recognition given by others.
In summary, the philosophy of constructionism claims that cognition is constructed in a 
certain way, such as a bundle of impressions or power–correlation. Notably, we cannot reach 
and perceive substantial essence itself in the strict epistemological sense because essence is 
objectivized in relation to “my” desire and concern. The idea of constructionism is more persuasive 
than that of essentialism in terms of the possibility of experiential verification and a clear vision 
of cognitive structure. However, is there really no essence validated beyond cultural and social 
differences? Is there no way to create universal common understandings without oppression and 
discrimination? Strictly speaking, no one can say “no” in the absolute sense because there are no 
facts in the world as Hume and Nietzsche presented it. 
3. Social Constructionism and Phenomenological Essentialism
3-1. Social Constructionism as Modified Relativism
Essentialism may turn out to label social minorities by means of relating “essence” to “substance.” 
On the other hand, constructionism can avoid the risk of oppression and discrimination by 
claiming that “essence” is socially and culturally constructed. However, the point is that the 
validity of essence is deeply related to the realm of normative consciousness and social ethics; 
thus, essentialism and constructionism are inevitably confronted with epistemological and ethical 
aporia. Because radical constructionism maintains that everything has already been constructed, 
it cannot mention the universal grounds of social justice in order to save social minorities. In 
other words, the ideas of justice, human rights, freedom, or goodness cannot cross the border of 
cultural diversity in the logic of constructionism; as a result, ethical relativism appears. Social 
constructionism, i.e., the idea that mutual social interaction generates “meanings” and “values” 
within a community, also shares similar challenges and difficulties. 
According to Kenneth J. Gergen, the basic thesis of social constructionism is represented 
in the statement “what we take to be the truth about the world importantly depends on the social 
relationships of which we are a part.”?? Long-honored words such as “reality,” “objectivity,” 
“reason,” and “knowledge” are questioned, and the way in which these traditional concepts 
appeared from social relations is a crucial matter.?? 
As a matter of course, the subject–object schema for the problem of knowledge in modern 
philosophy is criticized in terms of four perspectives:?? the ways in which we describe and explain 
the world are not required by “what there is”; the ways in which we describe and explain the 
world are the outcomes of relationships; constructions gain their significance from their social 
utility; and values are created and sustained within forms of life, including science. That is, social 
constructionism claims that there is no absolute being itself in any sense and that all objects are 
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reflected by social relationship, social utility, and form of life. On these points, the author agrees 
with social constructionism. 
Moreover, it is clear that social constructionism is not simple skepticism or relativism 
because it comprehends the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein and Derrida and the theory of 
power of Foucault and Deleuze. On the contrary, Gergen is conscious of lacking grounds for 
social justice and equality in constructionist thought: “Standing before us is a vast spectrum of 
possibility, an endless invitation to innovation. This is not to say that we should abandon all that 
we take to be real and good because it is socially constructed. Not at all!! It is only because we 
socially construct that there are meaningful realities, and valued actions.”??
Thus, according to Gergen, oppressive tradition and history should be abandoned; 
however, tradition and history that act under the direction of social utility and individual freedom 
should be preserved. New words and interpretations are required to overcome various forms 
of discrimination and prejudice and to promote dialogue among different cultures. Such a 
fundamental motif of social constructionism is convincing and reasonable. Consequently and in 
line with this, it can be argued that social constructionism thinks of the possibility of a new form 
of morals and ethics although every perspective is socially constructed.?? However, it is also clear 
that social constructionism is no less relative in that it has no philosophical criteria of justification 
and validity to distinguish good from evil. What type of “construction” is to be justified? How 
is an act regarded as good? The conditions and grounds of validity are diffused through social 
construction into cultural diversity. It is still involved in epistemological aporia, and social 
constructionism has no fundamental methodology to resolve this problem. 
In short, when the logic of the strong is accumulated in history and institutionalization 
and the conventionalization of it become commonplace, we must relativize it uncompromisingly 
from the point of the view of the weak. In addition, when the traditions of a community oppress 
individual freedom, we feel suffocated by the society. In this regard, social constructionism is 
a significant idea that liberates downtrodden people from power-based suppression. However, 
liberation cannot be justified in the context of social constructionism because the idea of liberation 
is also socially constructed. This is the inevitable result of social constructionism, which has 
abandoned the possibility of universal consensus. 
Moreover, the sociology of knowledge based on a constructionist guide falls into similar 
difficulties in the same way. For instance, according to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, 
“specific agglomerations of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ pertain to specific social context”; therefore, 
it is irrational to separate one from the other.?? Here, it is not difficult to see that the problem in 
principle is the very same epistemological aporia lying between essentialism and constructionism. 
They note that “humanness is socio-culturally variable”;?? however, what is the exact verification 
for that statement? Relativism will rebound on itself. 
The author claims that we should reconsider the possibility of common understandings 
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beyond cultural and religious differences, especially in the realm of meanings and values. In 
averting the violence of dogmatic essentialism, a way of thinking is required in which people 
with different values and sensibilities do not sacrifice to create intersubjective confirmation. 
Simultaneously, a cultivation of a sense of mutual recognition is also required. 
3-2. Phenomenological Essentialism: Intersubjective Confirmation and Mutual Recognition
Edmund Husserl established phenomenology as eidetic science at the outset. He astutely 
distinguished “eidetic sciences” from “sciences of matters of fact.”?? The aim of phenomenological 
essentialism consists in elucidating and developing formal ontology and material ontology. 
However, Husserl thought the transcendental problem (subject–object problem) should be 
resolved before developing ontologies. Without the fundamental elucidation of the transcendental 
enterprise, it would not be possible to create universality and common understandings in the realm 
of ontology that should be established as “rigorous science.” 
Husserl claims that “‘essence’ designated what is to be found in the very own being of 
an individuum as the What of an individuum. Any such What can, however, be ‘put into an 
idea.’ Experiencing, or intuition of something individual can become transmuted into eidetic 
seeing (ideation).”?? Thus, phenomenological essentialism seems to be no more than traditional 
essentialism on the surface, i.e., it is focused on the difference of modality between fact and 
essence. 
However, phenomenological essentialism should be separated from the general form 
of essentialism in the manner of Plato and Leibniz. According to Husserl, phenomenology is 
often criticized as “platonizing realism,” which regards ideas or essences as substantial realities 
(“Platonic hypostatization”) but generates misunderstanding in truth.?? On the one hand, “matter 
of fact” and “essence” are capable of making distinctions because “the two sorts of intuition are 
essentially different.” But, on the other hand, the two aspects are inseparable because “no intuition 
of essence is possible without the free possibility of turning one’s regard to a ‘corresponding’ 
individual and forming a consciousness of an example.”?? Therefore, “all the semimystical 
thoughts clinging particularly to the concepts Eidos (idea) and essence will remain cleanly 
separated from them.”??
It should be noted that “essence” (idea) is closely connected with “matter of fact” 
(experience) in phenomenological essentialism. However, it is still possible to extract two 
different intuitions, i.e., “eidetic seeing” and “intuition of something individual,” and two 
distinct objectivities, i.e., “essence” and “matter of fact,” through the reflecting subjective 
process of consciousness. To grasp essences, phenomenology does not require any substantial 
and transcendent beings at all. That is, phenomenology attempts to inquire essential structures of 
consciousness and world without substantial entities and the existence of God.
The specific characteristics of phenomenological essentialism will be made clearer if the 
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concept of “the phenomenological epoche” is considered. Husserl starts with a consideration 
of the form of life in the natural attitude. Mundanely, I know that “as what confronts me, I 
continually find the one spatiotemporal actuality to which I belong like all other human beings 
who are to be found in it and who are related to it as I am. I find the ‘actuality’, the word already 
says it, as a factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to me as factually 
existing.”?? Husserl calls this “the general positing which characterizes the natural attitude.” 
However, in order to carry out critique of cognition, phenomenologists cannot stay in the natural 
attitude that presupposes subject–object schema naively and naturally. As we have seen in earlier 
sections, the confrontation between essentialism and constructionism radically exists as the 
problem of epistemology or the problem of cognition. Husserl’s solution is clear. He claims that 
phenomenologists should shift their attitudes from the subject–object schema to the immanence–
transcendence schema, i.e., methodologically supposing every object (transcendence) in the world 
is constituted in the transcendental subjectivity (immanence), drawing its “meaning” (the What) 
from the realm of immanence. 
In Ideas I, referring to Cartesian doubt “as a methodic expedient,” Husserl claims that 
“the attempt to doubt anything attended to as something on hand necessarily effects a certain 
annulment of positing,” that is, “while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, ‘put it 
out of action,’ we ‘excluded it,’ we ‘parenthesize it.??’” This peculiar epoche is conducted as 
refraining from judgment that discloses the realm of transcendental subjectivity and “the whole 
phenomenological region, accessible to us.”?? This set of processes is known as “phenomenological 
reduction,” which enables phenomenologists to shift to the phenomenological attitude and the 
transcendental enterprise.?? Simply stated, this is a methodological suggestion to regard every 
object, conception, meaning, value, and being as “my” conviction constituted in the transcendental 
subjectivity claiming that there is no absolute truth in the world. Instead, a constellation of world 
images including private belief, religious dogma or scientific knowledge should be described by 
differences in the level of intersubjective conviction.
Husserl explains that “Reality and world are names here precisely for certain valid unities 
of sense, unities of ‘sense’ related to certain concatenations of absolute, of pure consciousness 
which, by virtue of their essence, bestow sense and demonstrate sense-validity precisely thus and 
not otherwise.”?? Consequently, regarding this point, phenomenology can be defined as the study 
of elucidation of the “condition of belief formation,”?? and eidetic seeing is the critical method for 
grasping essential structures and conditions of an object or concept.
Husserl describes the method of eidetic seeing with the statement that “it is based on the 
modification of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into an arbitrary example 
which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding ‘model,’ a point of departure for the 
production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants.”?? Giving an example of a desk, we start 
by placing an arbitrary image of a desk, and the image undertakes a role as a “guiding model” 
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for free variation. Whether a guide is experienced or imagined does not matter. Instead, it should 
be said that imagination and fantasy are critical to transcend actuality consisting of a contingent 
individuum in fact. Through conducting the method of free variation, we can obtain similar new 
images as copies and the imagination (various similar images of “desk”). Then, the unity of 
meaning (the meaning of “desk”), which goes through each variant, appears as “the necessary 
general form,” i.e., “as an absolutely identical content, an invariable what, according to which all 
the variants coincide: a general essence.”?? This general essence can be seen as the eidos proving 
“to be that without which an object of a particular kind cannot be thought, i.e., without which the 
object cannot be intuitively imagined as such.”??
Two points are notable here. First, a developmentally acquired general essence is still related 
to the actual world that remains dominated by spatiotemporal contingency. It should be purified by 
means of phenomenological epoche.?? Without epoche, the concept of essence in phenomenology 
will differ little from the Platonic idea or the substantial form in Leibniz’s sense. Second, through 
free variation, an essence as universality is given in the realm of passivity. If an essence is created 
by the free intentional power of consciousness, it is always bedeviled by arbitrariness. Stated 
another way, an essence will be acquired starting with an “arbitrary” example, and it should be 
freely and “arbitrarily” modified. However, an essence itself comes to the surface of consciousness 
from the unconscious and passive realm. According to Husserl, “It is passively preconstituted 
as such and that the seeing of the eidos rests in the active intuitive apprehension of what is 
thus preconstituted―exactly as in every constitution of objectivities of the understanding, and 
especially of general objectivities.”?? Passive synthesis guarantees the grounds of undoubtedness.
As presented above, a phenomenologist needs to have insight regarding how a certain 
belief is formed and what essential conditions and structures are critical to belief formation by 
means of eidetic seeing and reflection without any absolute truth or transcendent being. Thus, 
phenomenology is regarded as the study of the elucidation of the “condition of belief formation.” 
However, this does not mean that it is possible to acquire common essences in every field 
of study and ontological region. The most important consequence of phenomenological thinking 
lies in the fact that phenomenological essentialism can be defined as efforts to draw a line between 
common understandings and distinct differences. For instance, it is obvious that a Muslim has 
a different dogma than a Christian, and it would be impossible to phenomenologically respond 
to a question of which is a representative of “true” dogma. However, it is still possible to pay 
attention to the “mutual recognition” of differences because each belief is constructed with each 
undoubtedness. In addition, Islam and Christianity may have common understandings of the 
essence of “religion” because they share the essence of religion in that they both actually exist as 
religions. To take another example, “the sense of beauty” varies from person to person, but we can 
question why every culture and person has “the order of beauty.” On the one hand, in some regions 
the subject can come to intersubjective confirmation, but on the other hand, in other regions the 
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subject can recognize only the differences in an eye-of-beholder rhetoric. In order to make a 
border between them, “I” have to start with the transcendental subjectivity, which has evidence at 
least “for me.” It is not until I start from my reality, my undoubtedness, and my evidence, that the 
possibility of intersubjective confirmation and mutual recognition will open ad infinitum.
Consequently, it can be concluded that phenomenology should not be regarded as dogmatic 
essentialism but as essentialism based on mutual recognition orienting to create intersubjective 
confirmation. An essence in the phenomenological sense is not “captured” but “generated” from 
mutual affirmation and consensus. For Husserl, sciences of matters of fact, such as positivistic 
psychology and sociology based on the method of natural sciences, cannot deal with problems 
of meanings and values of human life and human nature. “Positivism, in a manner of speaking, 
decapitates philosophy,”?? and “merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.”?? 
Therefore, phenomenological essentialism overcomes the difficult point in traditional ways 
of essentialist thought and simultaneously accepts the idea of constructionism. In other words, 
phenomenology denies the form of substantial essence existing beyond experiences and claims 
that every object is constituted in transcendental subjectivity. In this regard, it can be argued that 
phenomenology is a more radical constructionism than those offered by Hume and Nietzsche 
because the ultimate ground of constitution of an object is nothing more than “I.” However, a 
phenomenologist is less easily satisfied with cultural relativism and nihilistic skepticism. In 
addition, it is absurd for phenomenology to substantiate “body,” “language,” “society,” “culture,” 
“time,” or “unconsciousness” to advocate socially and culturally constructing processes because 
the transcendental subjectivity (intersubjectivity) is the only place where various meanings and 
values are becoming. Starting from radical relativity, phenomenology will make an effort to seek 
common structures and mutual understandings among different people and distinct cultures.
It enquires into the common structure underlying the process of construction, such as 
similarity of the structure of body, emotion, rationality, or human desire. There is room for further 
research into the possibility of establishing the universality of “freedom,” “justice,” and “equality” 
in phenomenology, understood as the “science of intersubjective confirmation,” and the “science 
of mutual recognition.” 
4. Conclusion 
The confrontation between essentialism and constructionism appears as epistemological 
and ethical aporia. In traditional essentialism, the concept of “essence” is closely connected with 
the concept of “substance,” such as “idea” in Plato and “substantial form” in Leibniz, so the order 
between good and evil in this world is guaranteed and protected from skeptical thinking. However, 
the confrontation has another aspect. Essentialism may label someone as having substantial 
unchangeable characteristics, and it is criticized from constructionist theorists as leading to 
Some Remarks on the Confrontation between Essentialism and Constructionism: A Phenomenological Perspective
289
prejudice and discrimination. 
Against essentialism, constructionism claims that there is no valid essence because 
every object is constructed in subjective cognition. Hume attempted to explain the structure of 
knowledge by a combination of “expressions” and “ideas” based on a prominent position of 
“experience” and “observation.” In addition, Nietzsche described the world as power–correlational 
phenomena. On this view, there is no truth itself, the world itself, essence itself, or “thing in itself” 
in the Kantian sense?? but simply individual interpretation created by “will to power.” 
In addition, social constructionism and the sociology of knowledge take over the ideas 
of Hume and Nietzsche, maintaining that cognition and knowledge are socially and culturally 
constructed within a community, and no idea or principle can supersede the cultural differences. For 
constructionists, there is no universality in the world. Clearly, however, there are some difficulties 
in social constructionism and the sociology of knowledge. First, the idea of constructionism is 
inevitably relativized by constructionism itself because constructionism must be constructed by a 
certain ideology, position, or status if obeying the logic of construction. It relativizes itself. Second, 
because they cannot present any universal principle, it is not easy for constructionists to claim 
ethical validity and to defend the human rights of social minorities as problematized in cultural 
and gender studies. In short, social constructionism and the sociology of knowledge relativize their 
own ideas and make skeptical consequences and ethical challenges unavoidable. 
On the other hand, the author claims that phenomenological essentialism will overcome the 
confrontation between essentialism and constructionism in terms of “intersubjective confirmation” 
and “mutual recognition.” The concept of “essence” in phenomenology is not defined as 
“substantial essence,” rather, it should be generated through free variation and intersubjective 
confirmation. Phenomenology agrees with the idea that everything is constructed somehow but 
disagrees that there are no universal ideas. We have always been producing and are producing 
various levels of world images, from mathematics, personal opinion, and social justice to religious 
dogma, universal principle, and individual belief. Although the border between myths and 
enlightenment, insanity and rationality, consciousness and unconsciousness, good and evil, oriental 
and western, or man and woman will certainly not become final and binding, there should be an 
effort to rethink what kind of line is to be justified and in what kind of realm it is still possible to 
reach common understandings to defend freedom, justice, and equality in the living society. Then, 
regarding the differences, we have only to create an attitude of “mutual recognition.” 
One limitation of this paper is that it presents only the principles of phenomenology―
“intersubjective confirmation” and “mutual recognition”―and does not present concrete essential 
arguments in each material ontology. There is no doubt that further study of phenomenological 
essentialism would be of value to the fields of philosophy and practical social theories. Future ap-
pearances of specific and particular analysis based on the phenomenological method will prove the 
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